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Erdogan’s resounding victory solidifies Turkey’s pivotal role as a key regional actor, leveraging geopolitical instability to elevate its position on the international arena.

Erdogan’s resounding victory solidifies Turkey’s pivotal role as a key regional actor, leveraging geopolitical instability to elevate its position on the international arena.

The Cold War frontline sentry of NATO on the borders of the former Soviet Union, Turkiye found itself in the midst of the geopolitical turbulences related to the current multidimensional conflict in Ukraine. The revitalized military confrontation among global powers, the US-China strategic rivalry, the realignment of coalitions particularly in the MENA region and Indo-Pacific, also not forgetting the growing global economic crisis, represent the indicators of the changing world order, where Turkiye plays a historically important regional role, having close political, economic and societal connections with former Soviet satellite states, including the states on the European continent.

As a result, EU-Turkiye relations encompass a wide range of perspectives, ranging from a focus on EU integration and adherence to rules, to an association based on shared interests and transactional cooperation. Turkiye’s pursuit of EU membership faces significant challenges, with the accession process currently at an impasse since 2018 due EU Council’s concerns over democracy and rule of law issues.^[9] This impasse can be attributed to several factors, including enlargement fatigue within the EU and opposition from key member states (mainly Germany and France), as well as concerns about Turkiye’s democratic regression^[10] and foreign policy assertiveness. Despite the obstacles, EU programs and funds, such as the Instrument of Pre-accession Assistance, still play a role in promoting reforms and supporting civil society in Turkiye. In economic terms, Turkiye is the Union’s largest trading partner, accounting for a substantial portion of its imports and exports.^[11] Turkiye also claims to have an increasing role in European supply chains, indicating a mutually beneficial economic relationship. However, the breaches of the rule of law in Turkiye pose a threat to this area of cooperation.

Adding fuel to the fire, the recent militarization of the Greek part of Cyprus, the inclusion of the Greek part of the Cypriot administration into the US State Department’s National Guard Bureau’s State Partnership Program in 2022, including the lifting of the 2023 arms embargo, increased the harsh response of the Turkish diplomacy recently, and also elevated the possibility of Cyprus being involved in an armed conflict, evident from the fears affirmed by certain Cyprus politicians. Therefore, from Turkish foreign policy perspective, the Cyprus issue is being instrumentalized as the foundation of the Turkish geo-economic ambitions. If this was not enough, the maritime disputes in the Aegean and Mediterranean, the incompatible positions on sovereignty, maritime waters, and Exclusive Economic Zones, have further strained relations between Turkiye, and its Mediterranean neighbors. In fact, Turkiye aiming to protect its perceived rights and interests, deployed oil and gas research vessels in the Mediterranean, revitalizing the disputes over maritime boundaries, drilling activities, and resource exploration. Simultaneously, it is expected that these circumstances would boost Turkish military presence in the region, additionally disrupting the Eastern Mediterranean military balance, since Turkiye seems to have a firm stance over protecting its Turkish population on the island of Cyprus.

Simultaneously, under the Erdogan’s leadership, Turkiye has experienced notable accomplishments in economic development, particularly within the military-industrial complex. While questions have arisen regarding Erdogan’s recent economic success due to the monetary crisis and devaluation of the Turkish lira, as well as the adverse impact of the February 2023 earthquake on Turkiye’s social and economic conditions, it is undeniable that Ankara’s foreign policy has undergone striking transformations. Noteworthy achievements include effective implementation of energy transport systems, connecting Azerbaijan, Russia, Turkiye, and Europe, the construction of Turkiye’s inaugural Akkuyu nuclear power plant,^[15] and the establishment of a significant international gas hub through Russia’s cooperation, triggered by the Nord Stream pipeline incident.

Erdogan’s military and political involvement in Libya, Syria, and Nagorno-Karabakh have further contributed to Turkiye’s growing influence. Additionally, progress has been made in Turkic integration with countries from Central Asian region.

That being said, the presidential election in Turkiye had significant implications for Central Asian states, particularly regarding their political and economic relations with Ankara. These countries value their trade relationship with Turkiye, characterized by strategic partnerships, trade, cultural cooperation, and mutual benefits, as the country serves as a major importer of their raw materials. Moreover, the outcome of the presidential election raised concerns about a potential shift in the direction of international relations and trade. However, experts believe that Turkiye will continue its cooperation with Central Asian states due to the considerable progress achieved in recent years. Turkiye’s burgeoning defense industry is another crucial aspect of Erdogan’s balancing foreign policy, serving two primary purposes. Firstly, it diverts attention from Turkiye’s currency crisis and troubled foreign relations. Consequently, the growing defense industry grants Turkiye greater maneuverability in foreign policy by reducing reliance on arms imports and increasing autonomy.

Over the past decade, Turkiye’s defense industry has experienced remarkable growth. From having just one company on the list of Top 100 Global Defense Companies in 2010, it now boasts three.^[16] The country has decreased its share of arms imports by 48 percent from 2015 to 2019, shifting from importing 70 percent of military hardware to 30 percent.^[17] Concurrently, the Turkish arms industry’s value has surged from USD 1 billion in 2002 to USD 11 billion in 2020, with over USD 3 billion in exports, making Turkiye the world’s fourteenth largest defense exporter at the time. Substantial investments totaling USD 60 billion have been made in defense projects, including the establishment of a navy to rival that of Greece, given the tensions over energy rights in the Eastern Mediterranean. Nevertheless, Turkiye in 2022 experienced a decline in military expenditure for the third consecutive year, reaching USD 10.6 billion, which marks a 26% decrease compared to the previous year. Despite a nominal increase of 28%, the impact of high inflation resulted in the most significant annual decrease in real terms in Turkish military spending ever recorded, according to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s data.

Analyzing the current Turkish-Russian relationship, the governments of Russia and Turkiye have actively sought to strengthen economic cooperation and expand bilateral trade. Official data reveals that trade between Moscow and Ankara has continued to thrive, with Russia exporting goods amounting to USD 4.17 billion in April this year. According to the Turkish Institute of Statistics, Russia emerged as Turkiye’s primary supplier, contributing to nearly 15% of the country’s total imports. China, Germany, Italy, and the US followed, collectively accounting for 44% of Turkish imports in April. The report further highlights that in the first four months of the year, Turkiye imported Russian goods worth USD 17.2 billion.

The same month, Presidents Vladimir Putin and Erdogan agreed to facilitate mutual investments and support the entry of Russian and Turkish businesses into each other’s markets, filling the void left by brands that chose to leave Russia. Furthermore, a roadmap for economic cooperation was signed between Turkiye and Russia last year, with the goal of reaching a bilateral trade turnover of USD 100 billion per year. The two nations have previously agreed to adopt the national currencies as a settlement in their trade transactions, including payments for Russian natural gas supplies.

The economic outlook in Turkiye also plays a crucial role in shaping the political landscape, particularly the policies of Erdogan and the political party AKP. Economic challenges, including high inflation and a devalued currency, impact the general population and can lead to populist appeals. Economic difficulties can also fuel protectionist and isolationist tendencies, as seen in Erdogan’s intermittent economic nationalism. Additionally, the economic outlook influences Turkiye’s foreign policy, potentially leading to a more inward-looking approach.

Being a part of NATO and a candidate for EU membership, Turkiye maintains economic ties and trade relations with its allies, including those from the European nations. Economic cooperation and trade are typically driven by mutual benefits, market dynamics, and economic interests rather than a deliberate agenda of destabilization. Besides the fact that recently Turkiye received economic support by certain Gulf states to alleviate the crumbling economy, there is no definitive evidence to suggest that Turkiye is receiving economic help from Russia or any other country in return for being a destabilizing factor for Europe. However, Turkiye’s relationship with Russia has been multifaceted and characterized by both cooperation and tensions. While Turkiye and Russia have engaged in economic partnerships, particularly in the energy sector with the most notable recent event being the construction of the nuclear power plant Akkuyu, these collaborations are driven by mutual economic interests rather than a specific goal of destabilizing Europe. Yet on the other hand, the open economic ties with Russia, are granting Russia access to the global markets, resulting in the ability to evade sanctions.

Regardless of the future circumstances, Erdogan would likely refrain from aligning with the declining approach of imposing sanctions on Russia, mainly because Russia has invested in Turkish bonds linked to the development of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant. Moreover, Russia has granted Turkiye the flexibility to delay energy payments amounting to nearly USD 600 million until 2024, and the transaction is set to be conducted in Russian currency, which translates to solidifying their energy-related agreements as well as deepening the mutual ties. These arrangements concerning Russian energy supplies take precedence over potential secondary sanctions that could impact Turkiye’s growing exports, having in mind that the Western partners would likely resort to the customary strategy of imposing sanctions, as demonstrated in 2018,^[18] which ultimately led to an economic recession in Turkiye.

Therefore, reforming the EU enlargement policy approach and exploring opportunities for cooperation under the UN or the OSCE are potential avenues for consideration. Managing EU-Turkiye relations will require careful navigation and reconsideration of the established framework for cooperation with Turkiye. While a government change could have led to a more positive West-leaning atmosphere, the global power dynamics and Turkiye’s defense industry may contribute to a more unilateral foreign policy approach, which not always corresponds with EU and NATO interests and EU’s foreign policy discourse. In summary, if the EU fails to fulfill Turkiye’s expectations of joining the Union, it is probable that Turkiye will maintain its traditional approach of maintaining a balance of power and seek other venues for cooperation, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or BRICS.

Analyzing the three hotspots, two potential courses of action present: one where confrontational relationship escalates to an irreversible point, and another where the current cycle of grievances and threats is disrupted, leading to possibilities for dialogue and cooperation. The EU currently faces the challenge of avoiding further crises by promoting de-escalation, strengthening Greek-Turkish bilateral relations, and maintaining hope for the reunification of Cyprus. Therefore, it is important for the EU to balance a constructive policy with measures that emphasize the cost of unilateralism, without being perceived as weak or undermining solidarity.

In the context of being a key NATO member, the Turkish (and Hungarian) veto related to Sweden’s accession into NATO and Ankara’s allegations that Sweden might be involved in assisting and sheltering individuals associated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the People’s Protection Units (YPG), highlights the internal divisions and divergent interests within the organization, affecting the alliance’s ability to respond effectively to security threats in Europe and beyond. Such divisions further weaken Europe’s collective security efforts and undermine the stability of the region. For instance, the incident of setting the Quran on fire in protest by a Swedish right-wing politician in January this year, additionally complicated the tensions triggering Turkiye’s hard stance towards Sweden’s prospects to NATO.

Kilicdaroglu’s electoral failure seems to have hinted the end of Turkiye’s aspirations for European integration. Erdogan’s last-minute cancellation of his attendance at the European Political Community summit that took place in Moldova at the end of May, indicates his stance of non-aligning with EU’s policies, although Erdogan’s recent statement reveals the mood to revive the bilateral dialogue. On the other hand, the fact that the leader of the European People’s Party, Manfred Weber, stated that no one desires Turkiye’s full membership in the EU anymore, seems to reflect the prevailing sentiment within the EU. This sentiment is indicating that while a close partnership between the EU and Turkiye is still considered important, the process of Turkiye’s accession to the EU must be halted. Although there have not been similar political statements regarding Turkiye’s NATO membership particularly in light of the upcoming NATO summit in July in Lithuania, the focus has primarily been on the EU integration.

Last but not least, Erdogan’s electoral victory means that Turkiye is unlikely to make significant changes to the domestic and international policies and will utilize his new term as President to solidify his authoritarian control likely by dismantling any remaining checks and balances within the institutional framework. His victory might lead to a more rigid stance, especially since he is forming a coalition with even more right-wing groups, which could result in concerning attitudes towards democracy, human rights and foreign policy discourse. Nevertheless, the recently announced cabinet comprising professionals with more moderate profiles, is seen by observers as an effort to soften the perception of his authoritarian rule. While some view it as a positive development, others speculate that it could be a tactical retreat or an attempt to handle the economic challenges Erdogan’s administration has created.

Having in mind the current presidential system Turkiye has, Erdogan may still exert significant control over the ministers and replace them as needed. His priority in his new term is expected to be addressing the country’s economic troubles, including high inflation resulting from unconventional policies. On the other hand, the elections revealed the deep divisions of the Turkish population having different visions for the country’s future and it remains uncertain if polarization will reduce now that the election is over. On the bright side, the impressive magnitude of the voter turnout, amounting to 86 percent, denotes a statistical value that surpasses the achievements of some Western liberal democracies.